

Abstract

FORCIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF PALESTINIANS TO JORDAN A NATIONAL SECURITY CRISIS by B.G Mahmoud F. Al khazaleh, Jordanian Armed Forces, 48 pages.

After several rages of war, ongoing and consistent state violence against the Palestinian mainstream and way of life, the diasporas of Palestinian refugees, across the Arab world and especially into the Hasemite Kingdom of Jordan have become an issue of grave concern. The Palestinian refugee issue is a derivative of the expulsion of millions of Palestinians after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, and after the 1967 Six-Day War, (which resulted in Israel occupying the West Bank and Gaza Strip). As long as their land is still illegally occupied territory, the Palestinian refugee issue will be of even greater concern because it enhances the potential of a new wave of refugees especially if the Israelis continue with their policy of dehumanization of the Palestinian. Most of the new wave of refugees would likely try to settle into Jordan, since over 1.5 million Palestinians already settled there. After narrowing the scope to Jordan, one can see the economic and political impact that a new wave of Palestinian refugees would have on Jordan's national security.

After going through various effects on national security, ranging from exhausting of resources (supply not enough to meet demand) to increased levels of frustration of refugees in Jordan that could lead to civil chaos and uprisings, a resolution can be developed from two options. These options are assessed on lasting solution, capability of implementing, and the political cost for Jordan's image as a moderate state. First, and highly preferred, is the political option, in which Jordan poses as the maintainer of regional stability, playing a key role in diplomacy and adherence to UN Resolutions. The second option, and last resort, would be a purely military option, which would entail the military closure of Jordanian borders to a new wave of refugees. Military leaders would be briefing the political leaders of potential effects and consequences of a military option, as well as the increased readiness of the Jordanian Army to prevent any elements that could provoke an internal crisis.

With the historical background of the region, the political positions of all parties involved (Israel, Palestinian, US, Arab nations), and the two possible options for solidifying Jordanian national security amidst enhanced Israel/Palestinian warfare, the political option is the preferred option, with regards to lasting solution, capability of implementing, and the political cost for Jordan's image as a moderate state. Along with the influence of US diplomatic mediation, international monitoring, and observance of UN Resolutions (International Law), Jordan can play a key role in bringing stability in the Middle East, thus avoiding dangerous threats to their national security.

Forcible Displacement of Palestinians to Jordan: A National Security Crisis

**A Monograph
By
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
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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The current crises in the Middle East may lead to insecurity and instability of the whole region if the parties involved fail to reach a comprehensive and lasting peace that provide security and stability to the all countries in that part of the world. The Intifada 2 that was erupted in September 2000 escalated the deterioration of security and stability in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza strip. The violence in these areas took the lives of many Israelis and Palestinians and thousands of people are wounded on both sides. Although this present conflict is part of an old, ongoing struggle over the land in Palestine, the question that still unanswered is how to solve this chronic problem.

Israel has used military means to protect the lives of its citizens after a wave of suicide bombing against civilian targets inside the country. The apparent goal of this action is to achieve security of their land. As we notice from the news that the tough fight between Israelis and Palestinians, during this military campaign, was in the refugees' camps in the West Bank, for example the Jenin camp. This camp had produced a number of suicide bombers who attacked Israelis targets during the Intifada. The case of Jenin provides a clear example of how Palestinian refugees may act if their problem is not solved. Palestinian refugees' camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon have

always been strong bases for militants and armed people. Therefore, the unsolved problem of those people will always be a root cause of many armed, violent, and terrorist acts in these countries. For Israel, the Palestinian population is growing very fast and that will create a demographic problem in the future, more details in the body of this study. Thus, there are some arguments for transferring those Palestinians to Jordan to bring security and stability for the Israelis. However, this solution will only shift the problem from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan, and will create another problem for the Jordan's security and stability. The purpose of this study is to describe the problem of the Palestinians' refugees and its impact on the region, and suggest some solutions to this problem.

The present status-quo of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the massive Jewish immigration into Israel, the building of Israeli settlements and population dislocation of the Palestinians and their transfer, cause an uncontrollable migration into Jordan and create political, economic and security problems, which heavily affect Jordanian national security. The Palestinian refugee issue is a vast and complex one that spans decades. Millions of Palestinian refugees have been exiled and are scattered all over the Middle East, of which half of them live in Jordan. In addition, many refugees have been continually homeless.¹

Although the refugee problem constitutes a major social, economic, and political crisis affecting Palestinians, Israelis, the Arab world, and the international

¹ Government of Jordan, Department of Palestinian Affairs, *Internal Memorandum*, Amman Jordan national Library, September 1994,4.

community, the past five decades have failed to produce an acceptable solution. Most of these refugees thought their exile would be brief, but prospects for ending the Palestinian refugee question look no better now than they have for decades. Negotiations between the Palestinian authority and Israel to settle the conflict by at least a partial Israeli return of Gaza and the West Bank have halted under the Israeli right-wing government. Even if there had been a continuation of the peace process by the Israeli government, the issue of the millions of Palestinian refugees was largely ignored. That issue was put aside to be discussed only in the last phase of the negotiations.²

The refugee issue was also addressed in the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of October 1994. In Article VIII.2, the parties agreed to seek to resolve the refugee problem.³ Despite the Oslo agreement, which set a framework for ending the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, Israeli negotiators have not even agreed on a definition for a 1948 refugee. No Israeli government has contemplated letting any refugees return to their land as the Jews could quickly find themselves a minority.⁴ Palestinian integration into surrounding countries has been uneven, host governments did not want to let Israel ignore the problem and Palestinians did not want to accept they would never go home. Thus, forcing more Palestinians to go to Jordan (from the West Bank, Lebanon, and other places) will not solve their problem, but will make it worse. Not only that, but the new

² Donna & Arzt, *Refugees Into Citizen Palestinian and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 203.

³ United Nations, General Assembly, *Resolution 194, December 11, 1948*, Internet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/gpal/docs/A_RES_194.htm. accessed 20 April 2002.

⁴ M.S. Staeh, *Palestine: Geography – Environment, Environmental Priorities in Palestine*, Biology Dept, an-Najah N. University, Internet, <http://www.Palestine-net.com/geography>. accessed 20 March 2002.

problem (forcing more Palestinians to transfer them Jordan) may create security crises for Jordan that may lead to a civil war like the one of the 1970.⁵

Jordan shares the longest borders with Israel. The possibility of having a new wave of Palestinian displacement to Jordan is high for more than one reason. The Palestinian growth rate is higher than Israel's. The CIA world fact book (2001) predicted that the ratio of Palestinians to Israeli in 2020 would be 1:2.4 besides that; the high level of violence in Gaza and the West Bank might cause a major displacement of Palestinians.⁶ Increased Jewish Immigration from Russia, Africa and Eastern Europe into Israel, with the lack of natural resources, is another reason for the possible displacement. All these may lead to expelling as many Palestinians as possible in the ongoing internal conflict. The only safe passage would be to Jordan. This will create a national security crisis.

This monograph will answer the following question: Will the forcible displacement of Palestinians to Jordan create a national security crisis for the country? Throughout this monograph the author will discuss several issues including: the Palestinian refugee, Jordanian national security, and exploration of the military and political solutions in facing this crisis.

⁵Judith, Miller. *God has Ninety-Names*, New York, Simon & Schustar, NY 1996.

⁶United Nations Relief and Works Agency, *Emergency Appeal Eleventh Progress Report*, Gaza: Internet, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/arabic.html>. accessed 20 October 2001.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For this study, the author used a descriptive and analytical approach to the research, to give a historical background, reveal the criteria and its analysis, and developed a conclusion. To show the seriousness of the research problem, the study will discuss the Palestinian issue as a regional topic and will focus on the impact of Palestinian displacement on Jordan in terms of its political, national security consequences and on the end state of the country. The author will show several facts about the number of Palestinian in Jordan and some other Arab countries in comparison with its populations, the rate of growth and unemployment on those countries. Then, the study will discuss the issues of concern, with regards to Jordanian national security, where the first and the most vital one is the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflicts and how it reflected by expelling three waves of Palestinian refugees into Jordan during the long history of the conflicts. Based on the literature, we can conclude that this problem will affect Jordanian national security in the following areas: an increase in the number of radical groups in the country, an expectation of more terrorist activities supported by some extremist groups, and threat to the political system of changing the regime, like civil war in 1970.⁷

The author will explore his analytical views of the threats to Israel posed by its Arab neighbors, where there are many elements that have guided the

⁷ Armed Conflict Events Data, *Black September in Jordan 1970-1971*, internet, <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm>. accessed 21 April 2002.

Israeli approach to their nation's security. According to Shai Feldman, an Israeli Senior Research Fellow at the Center of Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, there are three major assumptions behind Israeli approach: general Arab rejection of an Israeli state at the expense of the Palestinian displacement, general Israeli belief that there is no assurance of aid from other countries or international organizations to solidify Israel's survive, security, and peaceful relations with other states, and vast quantitative Arab advantages including, size of population and armed forces, territory and strategic depth, and natural resources.⁸

The author will review some other countries' positions relevant to the research problem, such as the Palestinian, Israeli, and US positions. At the end, there will be a presentation of a brief discussion of those positions, and their impact on the problem.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Hostility between Palestinians and Israelis stems from the conflicting claims of two groups to the same territory. United Nations Resolutions 181 of 1947 attempted to reconcile tension by partitioning the British-controlled Palestine into two independent nation-states. Palestinians rejected the partition

⁸ Shai Feldman, *Bridging the gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East*. (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997) 7-8.

plan, which assigned the smaller Jewish population a larger area, arguing that neither Jewish history nor the recent tragedy of the Holocaust invalidated their own rights as legal residents of Palestine. In 1948, Jewish settlers declared an Israeli state and quickly seized the offensive in communal warfare. Israeli attacks on Palestinian towns and villages during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 and in the years leading up to the war should be understood as a form of de facto ethnic cleansing intended to expand the territory under Jewish control and clear the local Palestinian population from its interior.⁹

Ninety percent of 1948 refugees explain flight from their homes as a response to the violence of militias. Israeli forces, including the massacre at Deir Yasin, committed 35 known atrocities.¹⁰ Between 1947 and 1949, 805,067 Palestinians from 513 communities abandoned their homes. By 1949, only 150,000 of the pre-1947 Palestinian population remained in Palestine; of this number, 20 percent were refugees within the state of Israel. The remaining 655,067 Palestinians were scattered throughout the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian property confiscated or destroyed in 1948 is valued today at US\$ 208,938 million.¹¹

The particular tragedy of Palestinian exile is that it has occurred twice in the past 50 years. As in 1948, Palestinians in 1967 found themselves caught in the midst of Arab-Israeli warfare and Israeli territorial aspirations. Most of the

⁹ Benny Morris (1987), *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee problem, 1947-1949*, 286-296.

¹⁰ Ahmad Al-Tal, *The Massacre of Sabra and Shatila in 1982*, available from Internet, <http://www.ummah.org.uk/unity/sabra/main.html>. Accessed 25 March 2002.

¹¹ Official UN Web site locator, available from Internet, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/arabic.html>. accessed 7 November 2001.

people impacted by the so-called Six Day War were refugees living within areas attacked and/or annexed by Israel: the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, and parts of southern Lebanon.¹²

Like the campaign of 1948, Israel's actions in 1967 were intended to maximize territorial gain while minimizing the presence of the local Palestinians population and relied heavily on strategies of ethnic cleansing, including campaigns of terror and house demolitions. 325,000 Palestinians, many of them 1948 refugees, sought refuge in the Arab states. During the 1970's, as many as 21,000 Palestinians a year were forced out of Israeli-controlled areas. The pattern of Palestinian flight in response to regional violence continued during the 1980s and 1990s.¹³ The third and most recent wave was a result of the returnees displaced from the Gulf States in the 1990 Gulf War against Iraq, which is estimated to be around 10% of Jordan's population, around 300,000.¹⁴

The Palestinian militants, unable to establish themselves in the Israeli-occupied territories, deployed their forces in Jordan, creating a "state within a state." Jordanian sovereignty was steadily eroded until the bloody clash of 1970–1971, the civil war between the Jordanian army and the armed forces of the PLO, their presence had aroused fears among Jordanians that the Palestinians' hidden ambition might actually be to take over Jordan and transform it into their

¹² Official UN Web site locator, available from Internet, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/arabic.html>. accessed 7 November 2001.

¹³ Official UN Web site locator, available from Internet, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/arabic.html>. accessed 7 November 2001.

¹⁴ Jordan Government Web Site, *Seeking Peace: Jordan's Stand in Gulf Crisis*, Internet, http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:qZn5WNDf_x4C:www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_peace.html+palestinian+refugees+gulf+crisis&hl=en. accessed 27 March 2002.

"alternative homeland". Even after the Palestinian defeat from Jordan to Lebanon, this anxiety was rekindled in the 1970s and 1980s by the oft-asserted contention by some on the Israeli right that, because of its Palestinian majority, Jordan was in effect the state of the Palestinians—in other words, "Jordan is Palestine."¹⁵

Throughout these decades, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were subject to harsh policies of repression and Israeli government attempts to resolve the "refugee issue" through resettling refugees outside of camps. Articulation of Palestinian nationalism was met with collective punishment, including the total closure of communities, a measure preventing Palestinians from holding steady employment; curfews, which sometimes placed entire camps under house arrest for months at a time; and the suspension of utilities.¹⁶

In the 70s and 80s, Israel's policies regarding refugees in the Occupied Territories and its attitude toward the larger Palestinian refugee issue consistently failed to acknowledge that refugee populations had become politicized and would not be placated by half measures. The clearest demonstration of this politicization was the Palestinian Intifada ("shrugging off," in Arabic), which lasted from 1987 to 1991 and was led by refugees in the Occupied Territories.¹⁷

¹⁵ Fahad Alfani, *what about opening the borders to refugees? Opinions*, *Al-Rai Daily News Paper*, 20 April 02, Internet, <http://www.alrai.com/fri/opinions/op4.htm>. accessed 22 April 02.

¹⁶ Talif Deen, *Anan rallies in favors of Arafat*-DAWN-International, 03 February 2002.

¹⁷ Esam Shashaa, *Intifada 1987-1991, Arab-Israeli wars history*, Internet, <http://www.palestinehistory.com/text/wartext.htm>. accessed 27 March 2002.

During the past 50 years, the international community has repeatedly called for a resolution to the refugee problem and condemned Israel for its abuse of the Palestinian people. The most important piece of international legislation on the refugee issue is UN Resolution 194, signed in 1948.¹⁸ The General Assembly, having considered the situation in Palestine, resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date

The Palestinian right to return home and to claim compensation was therefore guaranteed over 50 years ago but has never been exercised. Israel refused in 1948 to honor Resolution 194 in addition, continues to argue that the refugee problem is an Arab problem for which Arab States, and not Israel, are responsible.¹⁹

As legal measures to address the refugee issues proved ineffective, the UN has subsequently shifted its focus to humanitarian needs and to alleviating the desperate conditions of Palestinians living in makeshift camps. The UN's record, however, has proved mixed. For example: United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) were created in 1949 specifically to provide aid for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 displacements. Palestinians are differentiated from all other refugee populations and are not protected by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Due to UNRWA's narrow definition, 1967

¹⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, *Resolution 194, December 11, 1948*, Internet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/docs/A_RES_194.htm. accessed 20 April 2002.

¹⁹ Arjan el-Fassed, *The Right of Return for all Palestinian refugees to Israel proper is unacceptable to most Israeli Jews*. August 2, 2001, Internet, <http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/PalestineRemembered/Story419.html>. accessed 20 April 2002.

refugees are ineligible for aid unless also 1948 refugees. UNRWA concentrates its efforts on education, health care, and relief for special hardship cases.²⁰

The experience of refugee life in the UNRWA camps has proved pivotal in the emergence of a distinct camp culture and a Palestinian identity. In the face of "the permanence of transience" that defines refugee life, a new value is placed on older ties of family, clan, and village. Although some refugees possess the economic means to establish lives in their host countries, many remain in the camps. The situation of refugees in Gaza and the West Bank and in Lebanon, where refugees are denied basic civil rights, is particularly harsh. Population density and unemployment rates within Palestinian refugee camps are among the highest in the world, resulting in chronic poverty, overcrowding, a low standard of living, and a general sense of powerlessness and despair.²¹

The Madrid Conference in 1991 attempted to resolve persistent tensions in the Middle East through bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors and multilateral talks on regional issues. Despite initial optimism, both tracks of negotiations proved unsuccessful in resolving the most important sources of tension, among them the refugee issue.²²

The Oslo Accords of 1993 resulted from a series of confidential meetings between Israeli and Palestinians officials. The Oslo agenda divided the peace

²⁰Wadie Said, *The Palestinian Refugees' Right of Return Under International Law*, April 6, 2000, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Internet, http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:3zEzyFypSekC:www.acrossborders.org/ENG_AB/HTML/right_of_return.htm+Israel+refuge+return+palestinians+&hl=en, accessed 27 March 2002.

²¹Khaleda Jarrar, *The Palestinian Diaspora: History of the Refugee Crisis*, Global Exchange, Internet, <http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/palestine/refugeeFacts.html>, accessed 24 Feb 2002.

²²Miller, Judith, *God has Ninety-Nine Names*, New York, Simon & Schuster, NY 1996 pp. 346-347.

process into an interim phase to establish limited Palestinian autonomy and a final status phase to discuss more explosive issues, including the Palestinians refugee problem. When the Oslo Accords expired in 1999, the interim phase remained incomplete and discussion of the final status issues now appears extremely remote. Negotiations also raised questions about the future of UNRWA, as many UN donor nations are unwilling to continue providing economic aid to Palestinian refugees indefinitely.²³

The Palestinian refugee population is one of the largest and oldest in the world.²⁴ Jordan, among other nations, has suffered significantly from repeated waves of refugees, and faced with tremendous challenges in absorbing and accommodating this influx. Supporting the massive influx of refugee has impacted adversely on Jordan's economy as well as imposing demographic, political, and security problems.²⁵

The following table summarizes some facts regarding the distributions of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and other Middle East countries, where we can see the largest Palestinians populations are in Jordan, and the percentage of them not in camps is very high (%82.15), the rest of them lives in their own houses in towns and cities, but we can also see how the other Palestinians scattered every where spicily in the Arab countries, and most of them are in

²³ Ibid

²⁴ UNHCR by Numbers, Internet, <http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table3.htm> , accessed 27 March 02.

²⁵ Country Report: Jordan, *Worldwide Refugee Information*, Internet, <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/mideast/jordan.htm>, accessed 27 March 2002.

camps and in bad conditions:

Distribution of Palestinian Refugees (As of June 2000)

Country	Registered Population	Number of Camps	Total Camp Population	Registered Persons not in Camps	Percentage of population not in camps
Lebanon	376,472	12	210,715	165,757	44.02
Syria	383,199	10	111,712	271,487	70.84
Jordan	1,570,192	10	280,191	1,290,001	82.15
West Bank	583,009	19	157,676	425,333	72.95
Gaza Strip	842,622	8	451,186	391,436	46.45
Total	3,737,494	59	1,211,480	2,526,014	67.58

Source: UNRWA Liaison Office, DC21755-United Nations-New York, NY 10017

IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON JORDAN

The existence of the refugees in Jordan has added 1,800,000 inhabitants to its population. The tremendous increase in population brought about by the influx of refugees has imposed heavily on Jordan's economic resources, creating a major imbalance in Jordan's ratio of resources, in which the supply does not meet the increased demand. The waves of refugees to Jordan have led to the exhaustion of its resources like water and the attrition of its infrastructure and

created an imbalance in the ratio of demographic and economic resources. The refugees, concentrated as they are in the capital and neighboring areas, strain Jordan's urban infrastructure. Jordan must constantly increase its yearly allocation for infrastructure just to maintain systems that can accommodate.²⁶

The only offset that helps ameliorate the refugees burden on the Jordanian economy budget in over time is that the presence of the refugees has contributed to the Jordanian budget in terms of remittance from those working abroad, especially in the Gulf States. In addition, the international financial assistance received by Jordan to help in absorbing Palestinian refugees has been a heavy burden to the Jordanian economy, due to the additional uncovered costs paid by the government.²⁷

This situation served to aggravate the situation for Jordan's security and Welfare. As millions of unemployed, destitute and homeless civilians began draining resources. The Jordanian government and financial services and the demographics of the nation could change overnight. Imagine if the United States of America, with its strong economy had to absorb the cost of feeding, housing and caring for the entire population of Mexico and Canada, it would be a big financial .²⁸

²⁶ Abo Alhajaa, the Palestinian civil affairs general Director. Press confrenc, Wednesday, March 16 2002, *Al-Rai Daily News Paper, the statues of Palestinian in Jordan*.

²⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East* (General Assembly, 30 June 1997), pp 69.

²⁸ According to Canadian Statistics Menu, the Canadian population in 2001, was 31 million and the population of Mexico in 2000, was 97.3 million.

The presence of Palestinian refugees in Jordan has changed the structure of Jordanian society, creating a new society in which Jordanians of Palestinian origins and Palestinian refugees form a large part of its population. The arrival of the refugees in Jordan, and their integration into the Jordanian society has led to the development of new ways of thinking in the Jordan, both negative and positive. Some Jordanian citizens are showing increased sensitivity towards the economic status enjoyed by the Palestinians and the Jordanians of Palestinian origin that has caused internal tension between the Jordanian and Palestinian elements at the population. On the other hand, some Palestinians in Jordan have begun to feel that their political and social rights are not fully recognized by the Jordanian segment of the population. Some feel that they are excluded from the important positions in the government such as the military and the security agencies.²⁹

In Jordan, the Palestinian refugees enjoy the same freedom of political action as Jordanians, including voting rights and freedom of speech, which has had a far-reaching impact on the internal political map and parties in Jordan. Jordan has monarchy system where the king execute his duties threw the prime minister who assigned by the king him self and the prim minister selected his cabinet, but the Parliament members elected by the people for four years, upon their political parties. In his first three years on the throne, King Abdullah II has spoken out in favor of strengthening press freedom and modernizing the media. . The Jordanians press has seen several positive developments recently, including

²⁹ Shai Feldman, *Bridging the gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East*. (United States of AAmerica: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997) 11-12.

the reform of several articles of the restrictive Press and Publications Law. Certainly in comparison to the lot of Palestinians elsewhere, their experience in Jordan, for the most part, has been secure, benevolent, prosperous, and difficult to improve upon elsewhere in the Arab world, including in an independent Palestine. Even with the advent of 1970 Civil War in Jordan, Palestinian refugees are still more comfortable than other Palestinians in Lebanon or Syria.³⁰ This civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and the number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated as high as 3,500, Palestinians claimed that more than 2000 killed. Today, political agendas and all kinds of programs include a variety of proposals addressing Palestinian issues, even at the expense of other local problems. At the same time, the overlapping and organic relationship between the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons in Jordan with their brothers in the self-rule territories makes Jordan vulnerable to security problems and disturbances in those territories.

The political effects of the demographic changes caused by the successive waves of refugees will become ever more evident as settlement of the Palestinian problem approaches, for the nature of the settlement has a direct relevance to Jordanian national and political identity.

The Palestinians make up close to 50% of the Jordanian population, and have changed the political landscape of Jordan. The political weight engendered by the Palestinian presence in Jordan makes Jordan an active player in peace negotiations to find a last and justice solution to the Palestinians Problem.

³⁰Armed Conflict Events Data, *Black September in Jordan 1970-1971*, internet, <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm>. accessed 21 April 2002.

The political weight engendered by the Palestinian presence in Jordan makes Jordan a stakeholder for direct participation in the peace process and its results.

JORDAN NATIONAL SECURITY

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is bordered on the west by Israel and the Dead Sea, on the north by Syria, on the east by Iraq, and on the south Saudi Arabia. It is comparable in size to Indiana.³¹

The Middle East regional security environment revolves around more than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan is one of many states in the region who have participated in other disputes and conflicts. However, since the Palestinian issue is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it has remained for many years the foundation upon which much of the politics of the Middle East developed. For over forty-five years of displacement and no recognition and thirty years of occupation, the threat to the Palestinian people has become one of national existence. As a result, the Jordanian national security approach primarily evolved from this arena. Depends to a very large extent on the resolve and inner strength of Jordanian society to ensure the defense and independent will of the country, and to provide the citizens, wherever they reside, with the means of decent living, personal and financial security, and psychological and social stability.

³¹Peter Hendy, "The Desert's Challenge and the Human Response: Dimensions and Perceptions," *Ceres*, 19, No 2, March-April 1986, 17-30.

In assessing the dimensions of national security in Jordan, it is essential to recall that for centuries, conflicts and rivalries of differing political and religious ideologies have generated tension and crisis in this region. Since achieving sovereignty in 1946, Jordan has experienced such destabilizing traumas as the assassination of the country's first king and subsequently of two prime ministers, five Arab-Israeli wars, and a vicious civil war with Palestinian guerrillas, and repeated assassination attempts targeting King Hussein. Jordan not only has survived in this volatile climate but also as of 1999, the Forty-sixth year of Hussein's reign, it had achieved a high degree of stability in its domestic situation and in its relations with its neighbors. King Hussein had persevered in his pursuit of genuine Arab reconciliation, wherever a conflict arise between neighbors or within a country, such as his mediation in the Yemeni civil war.³²

Jordan's military posture was based primarily on the possibility of conflict with Israel, although on its own Jordan would be unable to counter a full-scale Israeli attack. The country's borders also were exposed to a long-term threat from a potentially hostile Syria. Jordan retained sufficient capability to give an aggressively inclined neighbor pause, but it did not have the resources to keep pace with the buildup of modern arms by nearby countries of the Middle East.

Jordan's military shield consists of three branches-the Jordan Arab Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Coast Guard. Throughout the armed services, high training standards are the rule. The military establishment developed high standards of organization, discipline, and training. Jordan has

³²King Hussein's *Biography*, Internet, <http://www.defencejournal.com/globe/feb-mar99/kinghussein.htm>, accessed 22 April 2002.

emphasized quality rather than quantity, and does not expand its forces more rapidly than is training and organizational capabilities permit.³³ Jordan also has a highly efficient police force, border police and desert patrols, which collectively form the Public Security Force. One of the main benefits Jordan has reaped from its peace treaty with Israel is the removal of a hostile military danger on its western border. Jordan has thus been able to freeze the process of conscription, making the conversion to an all-volunteer army. In 1998-1999, total spending by the armed forces amounted to US\$ 608.9 million, or 7.8% of GDP.³⁴

Although the army has converted from a conscript to a professional force since the signing of peace with Israel, it offers enough benefits and services to keep the combined manpower of Jordan's armed forces at about 88,000 active soldiers, not including reserves.

The king is the Supreme Commander of the Army, Naval, Air Forces, and the coast guard. The words here have a connotation similar to commander in chief as applied to the president of the United States. The king has, however, generally exercised close control over the armed forces and has even assumed direct command of the army on many occasions. The king has the constitutional right to declare war, conclude peace, and sign treaties. The declaration of a state of emergency may be made by decision of the Council of Ministers and is promulgated by royal decree when required to "ensure the defense of the realm." In such situations, the country's ordinary laws are suspended. The prime minister

³³ Jordan Personnel composition, *Recruitment and Training*, Congress library, Internet, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+jo0131\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jo0131)). accessed 27 March 2002.

³⁴ *Jordan Military Expenses FY 98-99*, Internet, <http://www.countries.com/countries/jordan/>. accessed 27 March 2002.

customarily had held the post of minister of defense. The Ministry of Defense had mainly administrative functions, including logistics, mobilization, conscription, and preparation of the defense budget. The operational commander of the armed forces was theoretically responsible to the minister of defense, but in reality the minister did not issue directives of an operational nature unless they had the king's approval. Operational command of the armed forces was eliminated and replaced by the title of joint chief of staff of the armed forces subordinate to him were the air force chief of the staff, the chief of staff of the land forces, and the coast guard commander.³⁵

The Public Security Force, the country's national police establishment, exercised the primary responsibility for the routine maintenance of law and order. Centralized in time of peace within the Public Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, the police were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and under the control of the army commander in the event of war. The police were classified broadly according to areas of geographic responsibility. The three major divisions were the metropolitan, (Amman), rural, and desert contingents. Police headquarters in Amman provided both an administrative control points for the countrywide system and an array of centralized technical functions that supported police activities throughout the kingdom. Below the central headquarters, with its overall responsibility for police, security, and law enforcement activities, were twelve regional directorates, each one subdivided into number of security centers. Public Security Force missions included the

³⁵ *Jordan Armed Forces, Command Structure Of National Defense*, Congress Library, Internet, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+jo0127\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jo0127)). accessed 27 March 2002.

usual tasks of maintenance of public order, protection of life and property, investigation of criminal activity, and apprehension of suspected offenders. The Special Police Force within the Public Security Directorate had principal responsibility for countering terrorism, as part of its antiterrorism program; the government cooperated with various international bodies in sharing information and resources.³⁶

The general Intelligence Department (GID) exercised broad powers to monitor disruptive segments of the population. The scope of police and GID powers at times have become a source of contention from a human rights standpoint, although in non-security cases legal norms had been generally observed by police and judicial authorities.³⁷

By the last decades Jordan's deepening domestic economic plight had combined with the tapering off of Arab aid to place severe pressure on the military budget. Nonetheless, in an era of rapidly evolving weapons technology, a constant effort would be necessary to maintain the credibility of national security institutions as the guarantors of Jordan's domestic stability, its territorial integrity, and its role as a moderating factor in Middle East peace efforts.

JORDAIAN ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY

As mentioned before, Jordan was host to three waves of Palestinian

³⁶ *Jordan Police Forces*, Congress Library, Internet, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+jo0143\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jo0143)), accessed 27 March 2002.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

refugees during the past 50 years. To understand how the forcible displacement of Palestinians would affect Jordanian national security, one must look at several issues of importance.

The first issue is the asymmetrical balance of natural resources versus the rest of the regional states. Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources, consisting mainly of phosphate and limestone. Less than 7% of Jordan's land is arable. Virtually all of the oil needed is imported, and water is an increasingly scarce resource. Securing the rightful share of water from the Jordan River Basin, and searching for ways to alleviate water shortage, coupled with limited resources and high population growth rate, (around 3%), is increasing Jordan's deficit in its water supply. Economic issues that Jordan is encountering include the prevailing regional imbalances in terms of wealth, the existence of sizeable and crippling debt burdens, and the widening of trade and balance of payment gaps.³⁸ A new wave of Palestinian refugees would take this problem to a dangerous level, since the supply would not be able to satisfy the increased demand.

The second issue is the arms transfers to the region, which is another cause of instability. The ongoing arms race has been the product of the unresolved political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and other regional conflicts. This is of grave concern to Jordan because countries in the region will not accept any form of arms control until some form of regional security and

³⁸ *The Madrid Peace Process, October 1991*, By Jordan Delegation, Internet, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_peace2.html. accessed 27 March 2002.

stability is underway, which will remove their concerns of military aggression.³⁹

The third issue is the unique geo-strategic location of Jordan creates additional security concerns. The on-going arms race by the surrounding countries, in both conventional and non-conventional weapon systems as well as the high state of military preparedness, is a potential and direct threat to Jordan. Jordan shares the longest borders with Israel. Any misunderstanding or miscalculation by any one of the countries surrounding Jordan could drive any one of these countries to take a unilateral military action that could drag Jordan into a full-scale war.⁴⁰

Finally, there are no international allies that can come to Jordan's aid, since Jordan never entered into any strategic agreements or become a strategic ally to any one of the superpowers, even in the time of the Cold War. Due to the lack of international aid, Jordan has had to, on a number of occasions, reallocate its much-needed economic resources into its defense forces.

In the light of regional instability and political developments, Jordan has had to rely completely on itself to ensure, for as long as possible, the stability of Jordan and its society against any foreign attack or domestic subversion.⁴¹

³⁹*The Madrid Peace Process, October 1991*, By Jordan Delegation, Internet, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_peace2.html. accessed 27 March 2002.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*The Madrid Peace Process, October 1991*, By Jordan Delegation, Internet, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_peace2.html. accessed 27 March 2002.

ISRAELI POSITION

During four-party negotiations (Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and a Palestinian delegation), Israel has stated its readiness to accept 65,000 refugees under the following conditions: Select the refugees who should be allowed to return to Israel, excluding those who wish to return and live in their original villages. In addition, Israel will select the places of residence for all incoming refugees to ensure that the number of the Palestinian residents does not exceed 15% of the Israeli population in any place of residence. Clearly, there is a difference in the viewpoints of the Israeli and Arab delegations in regards to the return of, and the number of, refugees.

Former Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres summarized the Israeli attitude with regard to refugees in the following way:

Refugees are those persons obliged to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip between June and September 1967 only. Israel rejects the UN Security Council Resolution No. 237 as a basis for solving the refugee problem, despite its agreement with the Camp David and Oslo treaties and with the Israeli-Jordanian Agreement. The way to solve the refugee problem is to rehabilitate the refugees in the host country where they are currently living, not necessarily back home in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel cannot agree to solve the refugee problem the way that the Arab states want it solved, by re-settling refugees in their former homes. Moreover, it is not possible to settle refugees in an autonomous area. Both would create political, economic, social, and security problems for Israel.⁴²

Over time, Israel has consistently ignored UN Resolutions affirming

⁴² Interview by Shimon Peres on the CBC Early Show, February 4 2002, internet, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH015r0>, accessed 22 April 2002.

Palestinians' rights. In no case has Israel implemented the UN's provisions. Israel rejects the Palestinian claim of right of return to what is now Israel and steadfastly refuses to negotiate on the issue of the compensation except in the context of parallel claims by Jews who lost their property in the Arab countries from which they emigrated.⁴³

Israel's position is that the refugee problem is one of human considerations calling for refugee assistance and rehabilitation to lift the refugees' suffering. This position attempts to devoid the refugee issue of its internationally recognized legitimacy and its political implications.

ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Israel's analysis of the threats posed by their Arab neighbors has guided the Israeli approach to their nation's security. One of the most important issues relevant to this study is the relation with their Palestinian neighbors. For some Israelis, the Palestinians presented an ongoing challenge to their ability to reclaim their historical rights over the entire land of Israel. For the majority of Israelis, however, who were more pragmatic, an independent Palestinian state near Israel's "soft belly" raised four concerns. First, Israelis feared that a Palestinian state located so close to Israel's center would become a springboard for an Arab assault. Thus, the West Bank was categorized as a potential staging

⁴³ Shula Gilad, *Summary Report on the Refugee Project* (Harvard University, 1998).

area for the armies of other Arab states. Second, it was feared that a Palestinian state would manifest irredentist designs, seeking to regain control over land lost in the 1948 war. A clear manifestation of such possible designs involves the Palestinians' commitment to the "right of return of Palestinian refugees to reestablish communities left before and during the war. A third major source of concern entails the possible "Lebanonization" of the Palestinian state and the collapse of central authority under the weight of internal struggles. Various factions would continue their opposition to the Jewish state through terrorism, and there would be no single authority against which Israel could practice deterrence. Finally, there was deep concern that the creation of an independent Palestinian state would encourage Israel's significant Arab minority to demand "cultural autonomy" within the Jewish state. It was further feared that this would eventually lead Israeli Arabs to demand political autonomy, which would threaten Israel's integrity as a sovereign state.⁴⁴

PALESTINIAN POSITION

The Palestinians hold the position that the UN resolution affirming the Palestinians' right to return to their land or be compensated for its loss is binding on Israel. The Palestinians believe they have the right to return home, basing this belief on the UN's adoption of General Assembly Resolutions 194 and 237, which clearly state that Palestinians have the right to return home as soon as

⁴⁴ Shai Feldman, *Bridging the gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East*. (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997) 12.

possible.⁴⁵ Some prominent leaders' statements indicate they interpret the resolutions "right to return home" directly or otherwise to mean the right to return to the territories of the Palestinian state but avoid naming the geographical area in which the return is to take place.

In 1988, the Palestine National Council adopted a historic resolution calling for the implementation of applicable United Nations resolutions, particularly, Resolutions 242 and 338. The Palestinians recognized Israel's right to exist on 78% of historical Palestine with the understanding that they would be allowed to live in freedom on the remaining 22%, which has been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Since that time Palestinians struggled with the United Nations and the U.S to have resolution to acknowledge their state. March 12 this year the United States ended years of resistance to Security Council action on the Middle East conflict when it sponsored and helped pass a resolution formally endorsing the concept of a Palestinian state and calling for "the immediate cessation of all acts of violence."⁴⁶

The American resolution, which passed by a vote of 14 to 0 with Syria abstaining, affirmed "a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders." It also called on the Palestinians and Israelis to restart negotiations on a political settlement based on UN resolution 424 and 338.

⁴⁵ Government of Jordan, Department of Palestinian Affairs, *Internal Memorandum, June 1996*.

⁴⁶ Colum Lynch, UN Council backs a Palestinians State, U.S Sponsored Resolution calls for Truce, Washington Post, Wednesday 13 march 2002, pp A24.

ARAB POSITION

The Arab states have expressed their position often during the multilateral negotiations. They believe the solution to the problem lies in the following:

- 1) *The classification of "refugee" should include each person obliged to leave the occupied territories between 1948 and now.*
- 2) *Credit UN Resolutions 194 and 237 as setting precedent for giving refugees the right to return home and comply with those resolutions when solving the refugee problem.*
- 3) *There must be a clear-cut mechanism for enabling all refugees to return home, regardless of their designation as refugee or displaced person.*

Some Arab host countries, when suggesting ways to solve the refugee problem, include the possibility of settling the refugees in the host countries in which they currently reside.

USA POSITION

The US approved UN resolution 194 granting the Palestinian refugees the right to return home or receive compensation. The U.S supports all UN Resolutions based on paragraph 11 of UN Resolution 194, which recognizes the right of Palestinian refugees to repatriation or compensation.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Abdel-Azim hammad, *Challenge Of the Refugees*, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 461, 23 - 29 December 1999, Internet, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1999/461/re8.htm>. Accessed 27 March 2002.

In 1949, the US told Israel that it is necessary to abide by international law and allow 200,000 Palestinian refugees to return home.⁴⁸ In a message sent by President Truman to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the President indicated that the US considered it essential that Israel provide regional compensation for the occupied territories as well as monetary compensation to Palestinian refugees as soon as possible. The US saw this as a preliminary but essential step toward a comprehensive settlement. Since then, the US has slowly backed away from this position, which some might think is a result of different political party leadership over time, gradual intense pressure from lobbyists, and evolution in American foreign policy. The US now presents only economic solutions for the refugee problem, solutions that in essence do not expand the settlement of refugees beyond the areas in which they are now located.

The US presently views the Palestinian refugee problem through a humanitarian prism, leaving the political aspects of the problem to be dealt with by negotiation, regardless of any legal or political issues left unattended. In fact, President Bush recently declared the necessity of the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state via Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which is the first time a US administration makes an official statement of this magnitude.⁴⁹ If the refugee problem remains unresolved, the US would very concerned with the Jordanian national security, as Jordan is a key American ally in the region.

⁴⁸ Government of Jordan, Department of Palestinian Affairs, *Internal Memorandum*, June 1996.

⁴⁹ Colum Lynch, UN Council backs a Palestinians State, U.S Sponsored Resolution calls for Truce, Washington Post, Wednesday 13 march 2002, pp A24.

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

In the present political state of affairs, Jordan's only play is to support the voluntary repatriation of Palestinians whenever feasible. Jordan accepts the fact that it retains the humanitarian responsibility to protect, feed and care for Palestinians who are unable to return to their homes or towns, due to occupation by Jewish settlements or because of destruction from past conflicts.

Jordan's position, after having itself, experienced first-hand the impact of absorbing waves of refugees into its population, is that the return of refugees should be eventually conducted in phases to offset the economic, social, and security burdens that they will surely happen in Israel. However, the Palestinian refugee's aspiration to return to home is a legitimate one (UN Resolutions previously mentioned).

A similar model for a solution may exist in Kosovo and the Former Republic known as Yugoslavia (FYROM). After an imposed and supervised cease-fire was instituted, a multi-national Peacekeeping force was introduced while the combatants worked out the agreements for the peace accords (Dayton).⁵⁰ The combatants came up with the GFAP (General Framework Agreement for Peace). The major end state (which is the same condition for success here) is the voluntary phasing in of refugees back to their homes. If their

⁵⁰Office of the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Democracy in the Balkans, *Regional Stability and Implementing the DAYTON Accords*, Internet, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/>. Accessed 20 April 2002.

homes were destroyed, they were rebuilt with UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees) funds, if their homes were occupied, then the families occupying them were evicted. Prior to their repatriation, identification was established to ensure actual residency for each displaced civilian and the areas security and police force infrastructure were monitored until the safety and security of returning ethnic groups could be "reasonably ensured."

Jordan has been an active participant in all multi-lateral efforts and in one-on-one direct discussion between Jordan and Israel to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. In all cases, Jordanian negotiators conducted discussions with the Israelis, whether in multi-lateral committees or in direct discussions and have concentrated on linking the achievement of comprehensive and lasting peace to a just solution of the refugee problem. Jordan has been trying to obtain agreement with Israel during the Madrid peace negotiations in 1991 that international law supports the right of refugees to return home in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolutions and the world Declaration for Human Rights, reducing refugee suffering and providing appropriate conditions. And in the end, it has been trying to maintain continuity of remembrance of the refugees' cause at all levels and international circles to face the international community with its responsibilities toward such human catastrophes.⁵¹

Because of the overlapping dimensions of the refugee question, Jordan has called, from the beginning, for differentiating between addressing the

⁵¹ *Implementation of the Right of Return of Palestinian Refugees – A Condition for a Just and Durable Peace in the Middle East*, Joint Statement Issued by Organizations and NGOs of Internally Displaced Palestinians and Palestinian Refugees, Internet, <http://www.badil.org/Refugees/Documents/1999/4-99.htm>, accessed 27 March 2002.

refugees' rights (to return and to be compensated), which should be discussed at bilateral and regional levels, and redressing the difficult conditions under which refugees live, which should be discussed at all important levels. Jordan's intent is to separate the acts on one level that reduce refugee suffering from their displacement from issues of their legitimate and political rights being addressed on another level.⁵²

As we noticed from the previous review, Jordan will face a major national security problem if Israel forces more Palestinians to move east to Jordan. Jordan must prevent this wave of refugees because it is fully aware of its negative consequences on the country (political, economical, and social burden). Therefore, Jordan must think over the following options: (1) Jordan must use its regional and international political relations to convince the Israelis and Palestinians to sit down again to solve their problems peacefully. Both sides must adhere to the applicable UN resolutions and use peaceful means to achieve their political goals. The product of such political solution should be the creation of a Palestinian state. To this end, Jordan must play its role as an important player to maintain regional stability. (2) Follow political leads for solution and be prepared to secure borders by focusing on the readiness of the army and other security agencies on the country. (3) If both options fail, then Jordan must use its resources by taking a decisive military action to prevent the refugees from crossing the Jordanian borders, not to achieve the Israeli wish of incorporating a

⁵²*Implementation of the Right of Return of Palestinian Refugees – A Condition for a Just and Durable Peace in the Middle East*, Joint Statement Issued by Organizations and NGOs of Internally Displaced Palestinians and Palestinian Refugees, Internet, <http://www.badil.org/Refugees/Documents/1999/4-99.htm>, accessed 27 March 2002.

new Palestine within Jordan. This option will close the borders in the face of the newcomers by force.⁵³

It was clear in the refugees' chapter that the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis will not be acceptable to Israel if it continues to occupy and eventually annex the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, a solution will need to be arrived at for the demographic dilemma that Israel will be facing. In this matter, I will discuss three possible scenarios for Israel: (1) Jordan is Palestine; a theme repeated by Israel a number of times. In this scenario, a majority of Palestinians will then be transferred to live in the so-called East Bank Palestinian State. The argument stems from the fact that the number of registered Palestinian refugees living in Jordan is approximately 25% of the population, not counting the large percentage of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. This Palestinian state would also be a conduit for the some 600,000 Palestinian refugees living in Syria and Lebanon. (2) Israel would expel as many Palestinians as possible in the ongoing internal conflict. The only safe passage would be to Jordan. This assumes the possibility of Israel contemplating a short and well-contained war in the West Bank and Gaza, with the objective of making life so unbearable that many Palestinians will start moving out of the West Bank and Gaza. (3) Israel would continue the policy of building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, for the purpose of securing

⁵³Shai Feldman, *bridging the gap. A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East*. (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997) 7-31. This discussion focused on national security issues, and discusses political issues only briefly. If did not consider other elements, such as economic, social, or ethnic circumstances. I will narrow my scope to allow focused research and analysis of the national security implications.

as much land and expelling as many Palestinians as possible.⁵⁴

If any of the above scenarios occurred, it will lead to a threat to Jordanian national security. There are two courses of actions for Jordan I will discuss, (political and military) and determine whether or not they favor and meet the criteria of: lasting solution, have capabilities of implementation, and it is political cost to Jordan's image as a modern state.

The first course of action relies on the political solution to the Palestinian problem. It asks Israel and the Palestinians to implement the UN resolutions that were previously mentioned, and to only use the peaceful means to end the struggle over Palestine. Jordan will be a major supporter for both sides to reach such a solution, due to its good relations with Israel after signing the peace treaty, and with Palestinians as well. As a result, the crises of a new wave of refugees will not occur. Therefore, this political option would use the preferred method of non-violence and diplomacy to achieve the desired result of a lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution. All political templates are and have been in place, such as several previously mentioned UN Security Council Resolutions, to positively reinforce the capability of implementation of a political option. Finally, if a political option were successfully achieved, Jordan's political image would skyrocket even further, considering the large amount of Palestinians in Jordan. In addition, any time a third party can bring tow sides together peacefully; it would only enhance its stature in international diplomacy. Therefore, this option is suitable for all parties if it is reached, and will please everyone involved in the

⁵⁴Eugene Rostow, Israel's Settlements, their conformity with International Law, December 1996, Internet, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0c0x0>. accessed 22 April 2002.

potential crises.

From the Jordanian point of view, Israel needs to recognize the necessity of ending the conflict in the West Bank and Gaza on the Jordanian national security. Without resolving this conflict, the potential of new wave of refugees will always be there. For some right-wing Israelis, Jordan still is the place where all Palestinians should go.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, if the peaceful negotiations continue between the Palestinians and the government of Israel, and both sides reach a peace treaty based on the UN Resolutions 242 and 338, then the whole region will stand a better chance of lasting peace and stability. This agreement assures Jordan, that it will not have to be faced with another de-stabilizing wave of refugees. Additionally, Jordan will be able to focus on its internal policies and deal with its domestic issues.

For Israel, the political solution will solve the two major issues of concern: security and the demographics. It will provide a more secure environment and help reduce the recruitment and cultivating of suicide bombers (whose breeding grounds are the refugee camps) and therefore saving Israeli civilian lives. Israel now is facing the second uprising, whose roots can be traced to the Intifada of 1987 and 2000. Since its eruption, hundreds of Israelis have lost their lives and thousands of other wounded. Many Israelis live in fear of suicide attacks, the mere act of even going out for dinner or shopping, means potentially exposing yourself to a death defying act. A political solution, of this nature, in principle, has the potential to end this kind of violence. If the Palestinians are allowed to

⁵⁵Fahad Alfani, *what about opening the borders to refugees? Opinions*, Al-Rai Daily News Paper, 20 April

establish their state, they will have to accomplish this or won't have to resort to violence to force Israel to leave the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians will then have the undoubting task of building their own country, and self-rule. They would have to accomplish this by peacefully dealing with Israel to keep their state alive.

Regarding the demographic issue, the establishment of the Palestinian state will reduce the current ratio between Palestinians and Israelis. Israel will no longer be responsible for the millions of people in the West Bank and Gaza (Palestinian population), as they will not be part of the state of Israel. The new Palestinian state will deal with its citizens and control any potentially security issues (although some charge that it's failing to that right now). Palestinians also will benefit from the political solution. They are aware that ultimately violence will not achieve their goals of establishing their promised state, it would continue to reap condemnation outside of the Arab world and never receive the aid and recognition it would so desperately need to establish its legitimacy as a state. This political solution forces Palestinians to accept the existence of Israelis, and also to deal with any security issues or disputes peacefully. The situation, demonstrates that after a certain level of suicide bombings, that Israel is prepared and capable to react with more pressure and significant use of force against Palestinians. Even more significant, they can do this, without much of an uproar in the international community. The lessons of September 11, show that even-though thousands of Palestinians have been killed and over ten thousand wounded, the Palestinians use of "unconventional warfare" and the targeting of


civilians, somewhat justifies the Israelis actions. An untenable course of action set forth by conservatives in Israel suggested that the "transfer of Palestinians" to Jordan continue and establish the Palestinian state there. This political solution, in their eyes would provide for a Palestinian territory, essentially, outside of Israel's borders and therefore cease the violence by Palestinians by providing them a "homeland" and instead of forced displacement to Jordan, it would become in their terms a 'transfer.' This solution will give them a state where they can live peacefully and improve their living conditions. The precondition for success in this course of action is an establishment of a homeland for the Palestinians. The unpredictable factor would be, how well the Palestinians be at establishing good relations with both, Jordan and Israel, to lead an autonomous and responsible existence, and avoid conflicts with it's neighbors.

The second course of action would be a military solution. In this COA, the army would be prepared to secure the borders. This option is not attractive and not a lasting solution for Jordan if other options and efforts to reach a peaceful agreement fail. It is unacceptable to Israel, on one hand because it forces the problem of Palestinians inside of their borders squarely on there shoulders, but favorable on the other hand because it prevents Palestinians using Jordan as a safe haven. Such an option causes the Israelis to have to deal with the fact that they cannot simply "shut-away the Palestinians" because they will have no place to go this time. The Army and it's military leadership would have to deter the elements that would provoke the crisis, mostly internally from Palestinians sympathetic to any Israeli military actions against Palestinians within Israel's

boarders. Additionally, the Jordanian military would have to demonstrate its ability to peacefully quell any violence that may occur resulting from this policy. This option would be a joint effort between political and military leaders, to force the issue of the three states needing to come to an agreement. But this course of action will be costly politically to Jordan's image as a modern state, and it may cause a negative response from the friendly countries and some international organizations like UN for instant, Jordan in this case will be capable militarily to implement this course of action by it is own forces if the borders countries (Iraq and Syria) don't take military action to support the Palestinians like the one of the 1970.

This option will be feasible for all parties but it would not be preferable as a positive lasting solution for Jordan, as Jordan wants nothing to do with encouraging hostilities between the two sides and themselves (a large segment of Jordanian population are Palestinians). Nevertheless, if needed as a last resort, then this option would be implemented with no problems, and Jordan will not be capable to implement this option for a long time if it is not lead to a total war with Israel. This option prevents Israel from sending a new wave of refugees to Jordan. Under this option, Jordan will use its full resources to protect its borders. These borders will be completely closed by all means in the face of Palestinians who may be forced to come to Jordan from the West Bank. In such a situation, Jordan would take decisive military action to secure borders and deploys its military forces on the suspected area, the other security foresees like public police and Intelligence agencies will play major roll in this crisis to stop the

new wave of refugees. This option would protect the national security of the kingdom by not allowing potential problems from coming to the country. As we mentioned above, more Palestinians in Jordan would create political, security, social, and economic difficulties. Therefore, it is imperative to prevent their coming to the country. In doing so Jordan would prevent a potential tension, if those people were allowed in the country. Hence, those radicals would try to arm themselves to fight Israel and start a new wave of violence through Jordan.



If we look to the map on the top, one can easily realize how the distributions of Palestinian camps (smaller font) in Jordan can affect the national security efforts in preventing any sort of violence and demonstrations, in terms of supporting the new wave of refugees. If we adopted this option, it would involve

the whole public security police, and other security elements, to maintain control and security in the country, as we noticed the last tow weeks threw all of the TV channels the protesters and Raleigh's in most of Arab and world cities in favor of supporting the Palestinians including Jordan, where the Jordanian security elements spent a lot of efforts to control those demonstrators.

However, if refugees were kept off the borders, then Jordanian security would be protected. Having said that, Jordan must be prepared to deal with any potential consequences of keeping Palestinians off the borders, like humanitarian problems. The image of children, women, and elderly people under severe weather conditions may create a negative impact on Jordan, and it will be vital political cost for Jordan's image as modern state, but Jordan must take risk in doing so. There are millions of refugees on the borders of other countries. For example, the Afghan refugees are scattered on the borders of a number of countries surrounding their country, and so are other refugees in Africa. This option would be the best one Jordan has to take because it would protect the national security of the state.

After reviewing the options and their criteria, one can obviously see that the author favor the political option. All involved parties would be satisfied (via negotiations, "the most favorable option, is the political option, as it gives legitimacy to all parties and allows the international community footing on how to deal with a baseline of an agreement to settle future disputes. This has the highest potential for lasting success and has a high feasibility because it reduces the chances of violence, provides security and doesn't involve provocative

acts.”), as far as lasting, implementing capabilities, and political cost. Jordan can utilize the political option with no major problems, but would encounter rejection from an lasting solution standpoint. An all-out military option would be feasible but would definitely face utmost opposition and reluctance.

In this end I could say that the forcible displacement of Palestinians to Jordan as I discussed before will create a national security crisis for the country.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the refugee problem constitutes a major social, economic, and political crisis affecting Palestinians, Israelis, the Arab world, and the international community, the past five decades have failed to produce an acceptable solution. Most of these refugees thought their exile would be brief, but prospects for ending the Palestinian refugee question look no better now than they have for decades. Negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel to settle the conflict by at least a partial Israeli return of Gaza and the West Bank have halted under the Israeli right-wing government. Even if there had been a continuation of the peace process by the Israeli government, the issue of the millions of Palestinian refugees was largely ignored. That issue was put aside to be discussed only in the last phase of the negotiations.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Donna & Arzt, *Refugees Into Citizen Palestinian and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: A Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 203.

The political option is the best solution for this issue. As previously explained, it serves the interests of the three parties involved: Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians. Through negotiations and compromise, the political option would bring satisfactory results to all parties, whether it applies to feasibility, acceptability and suitability to provoke creating a national crisis for Jordan.

Jordan needs to keep playing its political role to secure a political solution for the Palestinians issue. It should keep talking with the U.S, UN, and the parties involved in the conflict to sit down again to solve the problem peacefully. Observance of already passed UN Resolutions, in regards to refugees and 1967 borders would be the simplest method to gain a political solution. There is UN resolutions and international law for a reason. According to the UN Charter, the UN has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. Therefore, without rules or laws, society would plunge into an animalistic chaos and anarchy.

In addition, Jordan must be prepared to deal with a new wave of refugees by monitoring its borders closely to prevent any crossing of these borders. The armed forces and the security agencies must prepare strategic plans to deal with such issue.

The Jordanian kingdom must implement strict policies and regulations regarding the movement of people between the two banks of Jordan. It must launch a political campaign among its friends and allies to explain the security

problems that a new wave of refugees may cause, not only for Jordan but also to the whole region. Jordan must explain to the Israeli public that transferring more Palestinians to Jordan will not bring security and peace to them. To the contrary, it will create unsafe eastern borders for Israel.

Finally, the government of Jordan needs to explain to its citizens the danger of having more refugees, and prepare them to deal with images of Palestinians who might have to stay on the borders for a certain period of time under difficult weather conditions.

I think that a problem can never exist unless there is a solution. Therefore, as complex and devastating as this problem can be, it can be resolved through the various options previously mentioned and via serious observation of the above-mentioned recommendations.

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